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With the increased emphasis that has been given to patient 
autonomy in recent years, it is not surprising that the question should 
arise as to whether any right to refuse medical treatment extends to 
incompetent patients and if so, how such a right should be exercised. 
Indeed, these issues are raised by Superintendent of Belchertown v. 
Saikewicz,l a Massachusetts court decision that has attracted a good 
deal of attention in recent months. 
The Saikewicz Decision: An Overview 
On April 19, 1976, Joseph Saikewicz, a 67-year-old mentally 
retarded person with an LQ. of 10 and a mental age of approximately 
two years and eight months, was diagnosed as suffering from acute 
myeloblastic monocytic leukemia. Although the disease is invariably 
fatal , chemotherapy offered a 30-50 percent chance of a temporary 
remission; such remissions typically last between two and thirteen 
months, although longer periods of remission are possible. A usual 
feature of the chemotherapy is the presence of adverse side effects 
such as severe nausea, bladder irritation, numbness and tingling of the 
extremities, and loss of hair. Because the cooperation of the patient 
over several weeks of time is crucial for chemotherapy and because 
Joseph Saikewicz, due to his mental retardation, could not be assumed 
to be cooperative, it was anticipated that it might be necessary to 
restrain him for extended periods of time if chemotherapy were to be 
administered. 
The superintendent and staff attorney of the Belchertown State 
School where Saikewicz resided, filed a motion in the probate court 
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for the immediate appointment of a guardian ad litem with authority 
to make the necessary decisions concerning the care and treatment of 
Saikewicz. The probate judge appointed a guardian ad litem on May 5, 
1976. This guardian, supported by the attending physicians, recom-
mended non-treatment. The probate court entered an order permitting 
non-treatment and immediately appealed the decision. On July 9, 
1976, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the probate 
court's order and indicated that an opinion would be issued at a later 
date. On Sept. 4, 1976, Joseph Saikewicz died (according to the court 
record, without pain or discomfort). The opinion was delivered Nov. 
28,1977 . 
Of particular interest in the Saikewicz decision is the use of the 
"substituted judgment" standard which, the court asserted, "com-
mends itself simply because of its straightforward respect for the 
integrity and autonomy of the individual."2 In reaching its decision, 
the court argued (a) that in appropriate circumstances, there is a gen-
eral right to refuse medical treatment for a terminal illness, and 
(b) that "the substantive rights of the competent and the incompetent 
person are the same in regard to the right to decline potentially life-
prolonging treatment.3 The substituted judgment approach is identi-
fied as the means of exercising the right of the incompetent patient to 
refuse medical treatment. In applying the substituted judgment stand-
ard, the court insisted that "statistical factors indicating that a major-
ity of competent persons similarly situated choose treatment" do not 
indicate what an individual choice in a particular situation might be. 4 
Thus, the court attempted to determine what Joseph Saikewicz him-
self would have wanted · in the situation had he been able to make a 
decision and express himself. After considering various factors, the 
court concluded "that the decision to withhold treatment from Saike-
wicz was based on a regard for his actual interests and preferences and 
that the facts supported this decision. "5 
Saikewicz and the Substituted Judgment Standard 
Is the use of the substituted judgment standard appropriate in a 
case such as this one? I shall argue that it is not, for the following 
reasons : 1) the notion of a right to refuse presupposes a decision-
making capacity that cannot be said to have existed in this situation, 
2) the nature of autonomy is such that it cannot be assumed by some-
one else (or by a court) without express authorization by the person 
whose autonomy it is, and 3) attempting to ascribe preferences to 
others apart from any expression of them is tricky business that places 
one on very treacherous grounds. 
One of the problems that surrounds the use of the language of 
rights in many discussions, including that of the court in the Saikewicz 
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decision, is the failure to distinguish various types of rights. For 
example, sometimes the language of rights is used to designate some 
sort of a guaranteed option, as when it is asserted that someone has a 
right to vote. A second type of right, which is also negative in nature, 
is reflected in proscriptions of such things as killing and stealing; the 
basic notion here is that certain things ought to be declared out of 
bounds to others in society. Thus, whether the claim refers to life, 
property or some other consideration, this type of right involves the 
assertion that whatever is specified is to be reserved for the person 
who possesses the right. A third type of right suggests that the person 
who has the right has a legitimate claim to something, e.g., healthy 
working conditions or a minimum standard of living. In this case, the 
accompanying notion of obligation is that someone, such as an 
employer or society as a whole, has an obligation to provide whatever 
is specified in the statement of rights. 6 
The assertion that there is a right to refuse medical treatment is 
most coherently interpreted as a claim that involves the first type of 
right - that of a right as a guaranteed option. The problem insofar as 
the Saikewicz case is concerned is that this type of right, unlike the 
other two, presupposes the existence of an agent capable of making 
decisions. Moreover, as is illustrated by the example of voting rights, it 
is usual to suggest, particularly when the stakes are high, that the 
presence of a well-developed decision-making capacity is a precon-
dition for the exercise of the right (hence the identification of a 
minimum age for voting). In short, to say that someone ought to be 
guaranteed an option doesn't make much sense if that someone is not 
capable, and never will be capable, of making decisions at a level 
commensurate with that required for the exercise of the right. As Paul 
Ramsey observes, " Incompetent patients do not have 'privacy' in the 
sense of autonomy and self-determination. Competent patients do." 7 
At best, to assert that the incompetent patient has a right to choose is 
to make a hollow statement. At worst, to so claim is to invite abuse. 
In all cases, it is to add confusion to the situation. 
Violation of Notion of Autonomy 
Second, even if the refusal of medical treatment could be said to 
have been an option for Joseph Saikewicz, to attempt to exercise that 
option for him, as the court did, does violence to the notion of auton-
omy. As is illustrated by the provision added to the New York Mental 
Hygiene Law in 1966, enabling the designation of a Committee of the 
Person to act on one 's behalf should one become incompetent,S it 
might be possible to delegate autonomy, or at least the right to make 
decisions justified by appeals to autonomy. And in cases in which 
patients have expressed treatment preferences prior to becoming 
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incompetent, it might be the case that autonomy can be respected 
retrospectively. However, if autonomy is understood as making the 
decisions relevant to one's own affairs, it is difficult to see how the 
decision-making process can simply be assumed by someone else with-
out undercutting the very notion of autonomy; quite obviously, if 
someone else is making the decisions, particularly without express 
authorization by the person to whom the decisions relate, that person 
is not in control of his or her own affairs. Thus, contrary to what the 
court asserted, the substituted judgment standard, as it was applied in 
this case, cannot appropriately be characterized as respecting the 
autonomy of Joseph Saikewicz, but rather would seem to stand in 
contradiction to the notion of patient autonomy. 
Third, in cases such as that of Joseph Saikewicz in wh ich no expres-
sion of preference has been made or can be made by the patient, can 
we with confidence determine what the preference of a particular 
patient might be? In discussing the principle of paternalism, John 
Rawls asserts, "We must choose for others as we have reason to believe 
they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason 
and deciding rationally."9 But however fine that might sound in 
theory, in practice is such possible? 
The court showed wisdom in not basing its decision on statistical 
studies of the population as a whole or on the projected preferences of 
competent persons imagining what they would do in similar situations; 
rather, as noted above, the court attempted to determine what Joseph 
Saikewicz himself would have wanted, had he been able to make a 
decision and express himself. But was there any way of determining 
this? Granted, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the pain and 
discomfort accompanying the chemotherapy would have been con-
siderable. But how would he have felt about things in the periods of 
calm between the storms? As the attorney general of Massachusetts 
noted in commenting on the case, "There is no way for us to know if 
this mentally retarded person 'fears' or 'understands' the pain; and 
there is no way for us to measure his desire to live or his appreciation 
of being alive. "10 In short, to attempt to ascribe preferences to others 
is very tricky business in situations in which the patient has not 
expressed and cannot express a preference. Thus one must seriously 
question whether responses to situations such as that of Joseph Saike-
wicz should be based on such uncertain grounds. 
The upshot of all of this is that the substituted judgment approach 
does not seem to be a particularly appropriate way of deciding what 
ought to be done in situations involving incompetent patients who 
have not had occasion previously to express treatment preferences. 
This is not to suggest that incompetent patients don't have any rights; 
indeed, I insist emphatically that quite the opposite is the case and 
that the personhood of incompetent patients ought to be defended just 
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as rigorously as the personhood of competent patients. Rather, it is to 
protest attempting to justify treatment decisions by making appeals to 
autonomy when so doing is incongruous and to suggest that we would 
be well advised to use other concepts of rights and other moral norms 
when responding to situations such as that of Joseph Saikewicz. 
Concluding Considerations 
It should be noted that the critique presented in the preceding 
paragraphs has focused on the appropriateness of the substituted judg-
ment standard in this particular case, not on the question of treatment 
versus non-treatment. To argue that the use of the substituted judg-
ment standard is inappropriate does not automatically lead to the 
conclusion that treatment is the only defensible course of action. It 
might be possible to argue (a) that priority ought to be given to main-
taining quality of life in situations in which treatment intended to 
prolong life would be· exceedingly burdensome, (b) that compassion 
mandates that certain terminally-ill patients be allowed to die peace-
fully rather than be subjected to intrusive forms of treatment of ques-
tionable value, or (c) that society's obligation to provide medical treat-
ment is not unlimited and that providing for chemotherapy in the case 
of Joseph Saikewicz would have been beyond the call of duty. But if 
any or all of these arguments are to be made, the issues that they 
address ought to be addressed head-on. Cloaking non-treatment deci-
sions in language that does not fit the occasion obscures the real issues 
that underlie many such decisions. 
Finally, in criticizing the use of the substituted judgment standard 
in the Saikewicz decision , I do not wish to imply that the expressed 
preferences of previously-competent patients should not be taken into 
consideration when making treatment decision. It is surely not 
unusual or absurd to suggest that the preferences of a person should 
be respected even in situations in which the person is no longer able to 
give active expression to them. When there is a track record clearly 
indicating treatment preferences, a strong case can be made for giving 
recognition to previously expressed preferences of an incompetent 
patient. Situations where such might be appropriate could include cases 
in which there is a recently affirmed living will and cases in which 
treatment refusal options such as that provided by the California 
Natural Death Act have been exercised. 
In summary, to speak of a right of refusal when no capacity for 
choice has ever existed, to make decisions in the name of autonomy 
when no authorization to do so has been extended by the patient, and 
to ascribe preferences to a patient when there is no track record on 
which to base these preferences is to over-extend the notion of patient 
autonomy and the accompanying notion of the right to refuse medical 
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treatment. To misuse a conceptual framework that has come to play 
an important role in discussions of medical ethics can only damage the 
cause of patients' rights. The irony of Saikewicz is that it undercuts 
the very values which it purports to affirm. 11 
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Are You Moving? 
If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a differ-
ent address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage 
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and 
more costly . Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with 
your address will be most helpful. 
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